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SUMMARY
This contribution critically examines the lawfulness of the use of race
quotas in the selection of South African (professional) sports teams. These
quotas purportedly function as affirmative action measures, and their
legitimacy in this light is considered with reference to relevant case law on
affirmative action and, more specifically, on the use of quotas in the
application of affirmative action (as this has featured in other contexts in
the case law to date). In the process, the author evaluates the
constitutionality of such quotas (with specific reference to their apparent
irrationality in the specific context of (professional) sport and its nature
and characteristics). The piece further considers the legitimacy of these
quotas at the domestic level in light of the application of the applicable
labour legislation (specifically the Employment Equity Act, 1998), and at
the international level in light of the applicable rules of international sports
governing bodies in the relevant sporting codes. The author concludes that
these race quotas are unconstitutional and have no legitimate place in
South African sport and in the continuing process of sports transformation,
and calls for their abolishment as a matter of urgency. 
1 Introduction
Twenty-two years into a democratic South Africa, the national cricket
governing body, Cricket South Africa (“CSA”), in August 2016 announced
the first national team to be selected (officially) in terms of race-based
selection criteria, for a Test match series against New Zealand. Media
reports recognised that the last national side to be specifically governed
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by racial guidelines was during the 1969/70 home series against
Australia, when apartheid precluded the inclusion of any black players.1
We may appear to have come full circle, although racial quotas in sports
teams and developments around “sports transformation” have been a
feature of the national discourse for the whole of the young life of this
democracy. Maybe not surprisingly, the transformation agenda tends to
rear its head especially in election years. 
South African rugby has openly (off and on) followed a quota system
in some of its competitions for the last few years. The former president
of the South African Rugby Union (“SARU”), Oregan Hoskins, was quoted
in the media in 2014 saying that rugby “will need to make “radical,
drastic, immediate changes” to comply with the pressure being brought
upon it by the Sports Ministry after Saru and other federations met with
the government regarding the proposed changes, including a possible
reintroduction of quotas into the Absa Currie Cup and Vodacom Super
Rugby competitions:2 
“Minister Fikile Mbalula threatened to withhold permission for sporting
federations to compete internationally if there was not a 60-40 split between
black and white players in future representative teams, saying the pace of
transformation was too slow among sporting federations. Hoskins said that
rugby ‘doesn’t have a choice but to comply’ and committed all 14 provincial
unions and Saru to ‘meet the challenges as rugby and tackle it head on’ to
make South Africa proud as a nation. ‘With the amount of pressure that we
are under now by the Minister of Sport to change at the highest level, we’ve
been told in no uncertain terms that there needs to be a radical, drastic and
immediate change,’ Hoskins told supersport.com. ‘The only way we can effect
change is to use the quota system even more extensively than we currently
do. This is not the optimum way to transform, it a short-term measure and
there is no other way to change representation in teams in the immediate
short-terms (sic).’ ‘While it may not be perfect, and not be optimum, there is
no other way we can meet the demands of the Minister of Sport and seriously
implement transformation in the Absa Currie Cup and at franchise level.
We’ve been put under serious threat by government, and we don’t really
want to have government intervening in sport. It’s not good for the game, so
we have no alternative as a federation but to look at quotas in our senior
ranks.”3
Of course, as has been the experience of sports transformation measures
since the dawn of our democracy, the process is often clouded in
uncertainty and, specifically, a significant measure of ambiguity in
respect of the terminology used by both government spokespersons and
sports federations in describing measures as constituting either “targets”
or “quotas”. Following Hoskins’s above media statement in 2014,
1 See R Houwing “NZ tests: ‘SA will be quota-based’” (04-08-2016) Sport24
http://www.sport24.co.za/Cricket/Proteas/nz-tests-sa-will-be-quota-based-
20160804 (accessed 2018-11-12). 
2 See report of B Nel “Quotas for Currie Cup, Super Rugby?” (23-04-2014)
Supersport http://www.supersport.com/rugby/sa-rugby/news/140423/Quo
tas_for_Currie_Cup_Super_Rugby (accessed 2018-11-11).
3 B Nel “Quotas for Currie Cup, Super Rugby?” (23-04-2014) Supersport. 
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SARU’s Competition Format 2015,4 contained the following regarding
rules for teams in respect of “Representation” for the ABSA Currie Cup
competition:
“SARU has adopted a comprehensive Transformation Charter that will guide
SARU and its Provinces on this critical aspect of the game. Quotas no longer
apply to the ABSA Currie Cup Competition. However, it is expected of each
Province to take serious cognisance of the issue of representativity of players
on the field of play in order to support SARU’s broader transformation
objectives.”5
While “quotas” may have no longer applied to the Currie Cup
competition at the time, the same document contained the following in
respect of “Representation” for the Vodacom Cup competition:
“Each Province shall take serious cognisance of the issue of representivity of
players on the field of play, to support SARU’s broader transformation
objectives. 7 (Seven) players of colour shall be in the squad of 22 (twenty-two)
players of whom 2 (two) players shall be forwards. At least 5 (five) players of
colour shall be included in the starting line-up.”6 
Even though SA Rugby took the public stance that quotas no longer apply
(at least in certain of its competitions, it appears), its strategic
transformation plan provides that 50% of the Springbok team must be
made up of “players of colour” by 2019. As recently as May 2017 a
spokesperson for SA Rugby was quoted as saying that the organisation is
willing to defend its “quota stance” in court.7 Media reports recounted
race-based team selection in cricket World Cup matches (in 2007 in the
Caribbean), as well as rumoured interference in team selection by cricket
administrators (in South Africa’s semi-final loss in the 2015 ICC World
Cup). Some sports federations, unlike SA Rugby (as per the quoted media
statement by Hoskins above) have continued to refer to these largely
government-imposed quotas as “targets”. However, events in 2016
provided some clarity on the true nature of these measures. At a media
briefing on 25 April 2016, upon the occasion of the release of the 2014/
15 Eminent Persons Group Transformation Status Report, the then
Minister of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, made the following announcement:
“I have resolved to revoke the privilege of Athletics South Africa (ASA), Cricket
South Africa (CSA), Netball South Africa (NSA) and South African Rugby (Saru)
to host and bid for major and mega international tournaments in the Republic




5 “SARU’s Competitions Format and General Rules (2015)” para 1.9.
6 “SARU’s Competitions Format and General Rules (2015)” para 2.5.
7 Unknown “SA rugby willing to defend its “quota stance”” (04-05-2017)
Sport24 https://www.sport24.co.za/Rugby/sa-rugby-willing-to-defend-its-quo
ta-stance-20170504 (accessed 2018-11-11). 
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of South Africa as a consequence of the aforementioned federations not
meeting their own set transformation targets, with immediate effect.”8 
The Sports Minister’s action was subsequently endorsed by Cabinet,9
although the legality of the ban is questionable. Along with the ban came
threats of non-recognition by government of these sporting codes (with
the implication, most notably, of withdrawal or refusal of national
colours for athletes participating in such codes, and their resultant non-
participation on the international stage for the near future). The reason
for the ban, according to the Ministry, was punitive in nature, and had
the stated objective of forcing these federations to toe the line in respect
of government’s demands regarding race-based transformation. In
addition, it is in this that we find an indication of the true nature of these
measures. It is generally recognised that targets in affirmative action
measures are aspirational, as opposed to quotas, which constitute a set
number or percentage of places to be reserved for beneficiaries, at all
costs. The difference was succinctly explained in the American context
in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v EEOC:10
“A quota would impose a fixed number or percentage which must be
attained, or which cannot be exceeded, and would do so regardless of the
number of potential applicants who meet necessary qualifications ... . By
contrast, a goal is a numerical objective, fixed realistically in terms of the
number of vacancies expected, and the number of qualified applicants
available in the relevant job.”11 
One aspect or characteristic of a measure that might (in fact, should) tip
the scales in favour of determining that it is a quota rather than a target
or numerical goal is if some punitive sanction is imposed on the
responsible official or employer who fails to reach the set number/
percentage of representation of persons from designated groups (under
the EEA) or persons previously disadvantaged by past unfair
discrimination (under the more general application of section 9(2) of the
Bill of Rights). By its nature one cannot punish someone for not reaching
an aspirational target – or, at least, one could not do so rationally. And it
is here that it seems to become clear that the Sports Minister’s ban of
April 2016, by definition and expressly, constitutes the imposition of a
punitive sanction on the relevant sports federations for their alleged




9 See Anonymous “Cabinet cheers Fikile’s plan” (30-04-2016) The Citizen
https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1095316/cabinet-cheers-fikiles-plan/
(accessed 2018-11-11).
10 478 US 421 (1986) 495. 
11 As quoted by Katz J in South African Restructuring and Insolvency
Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development;
In Re: Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Association NPC v Minister of
Justice And Constitutional Development 2015 1 All SA 589 (WCC) para 211.
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failure to meet a “target”. Clearly these euphemistically-labelled “targets”
function as nothing other than quotas.12
What has been largely absent from media reports and the sports
transformation narrative to date has been an examination of the legality
and constitutionality of such efforts at the imposition of race as a
criterion for selection of professional sports teams on both the global and
domestic stage. I have in the past written (rather extensively) on various
aspects of race-based sports transformation policies and measures,13
and feel that the time is ripe for yet another analysis of the legal
implications. At the heart of this analysis is the realisation that race-based
team selection is, at least purportedly, a rather atypical species of the
application of affirmative action. Once one accepts this it is imperative to
examine the constitutional and legislative parameters of lawful
affirmative action, and to determine whether cricket or rugby quotas in
fact make the grade in terms of the law. Here we must be guided by the
latest jurisprudence on affirmative action in the employment and other
contexts, including judgments of the Constitutional Court handed down
in the past four years. However, the legal analysis must be much broader,
in recognition of the fact that sports transformation in South Africa is not
just a political hot potato on the domestic stage. The application of racial
quotas in representative national teams and at other levels (for example,
professional franchise teams) occur within a significantly globalised
professional sports industry. It implicates fundamental principles of
international (sports) law, and the South African government and
domestic sports federations are not operating within a vacuum, even if
they (especially government) might seem to believe so.
In the section that follows (section 2) I will briefly examine the legal
framework for lawful affirmative action in terms of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) and in terms of our
12 For further discussion of this point, see the text to part 4 below. It should be
noted that the language of the Minister’s ban in no way indicates an
intention to sanction designated (professional sports) employers for a
failure to, for example, address and remove employment barriers for
players from designated groups (which they are obliged to do under the
EEA). The ban as a sanction appears to relate to nothing other than a
response to such employers’ failure to meet the relevant demographic
“targets”. 
13 See AM Louw “Should the Playing Fields be Levelled? Revisiting Affirmative
Action in Professional Sport (part 1)” (2004) 15 Stell LR 119; AM Louw
“Should the Playing Fields be Levelled? Revisiting Affirmative Action in
Professional Sport (part 2)” (2004) 15 Stell LR 225; AM Louw “Should the
Playing Fields be Levelled? Revisiting Affirmative Action in Professional
Sport (part 1)” (2004) 15 Stell LR 409; AM Louw “Transforming South
African Professional Sport: Some Observations on Recent Developments”
(2005) 9 Law, Democracy & Development 193-218; AM Louw “Evaluating
Recent Developments in the Governance and Regulation of South African
Sport: Some Thoughts and Concerns for the Future” (2006) 1-2
International Sports Law Journal 48; AM Louw “Extrapolating ‘equality’ from
the letter of the law: The limits of affirmative action under the Employment
Equity Act” (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 336-354.
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labour legislation. I will focus specifically on the law’s treatment of the
use of race-based quotas as opposed to racial targets, with reference to
the most recent jurisprudence on this issue. In section 3, I will briefly
examine the experience of the continued and persistent application of
race quotas in our sport, after briefly considering the application of the
relevant legislation in this context, and then I will consider the
international implications. In section 4(1) will briefly consider currently
ongoing litigation on sports quotas in a pending case before the Labour
Court. Section 5 will conclude. 
2 The legality of quotas in the application of 
affirmative action, more generally
Recent years have seen increasing calls from the African National
Congress (“ANC”)-led government to (re)institute race-based quotas in
(professional) sports teams, to ensure that teams are demographically
representative of the South African people. I have written elsewhere
about the role and place of “demographic representivity” in the
application of affirmative action, and have expressed my view that
representivity has very little to do with equality and that the pursuit of
demographic representivity as a prime objective of the application of
affirmative action (as it is done in terms of the Employment Equity Act
55 of 1998 (“EEA”)) does not conform with the parameters for lawful
affirmative action in terms of section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights.14 I will not
address those issues again here, but wish to revisit one specific aspect of
the sports transformation debate, which is particularly problematic in the
context of our jurisprudence on affirmative action, namely the use of
(racial) quotas.
The late 1990s and most of the 2000s saw a measure of ambivalence
in South African law on affirmative action in respect of the distinction
between affirmative action quotas and targets (or numerical goals), and
their respective legitimacy. The EEA contains a rather ambiguously
worded prohibition on the use of quotas in affirmative action
programmes implemented under the Act. Section 15 of the Act describes
“affirmative action measures” as including “measures to ensure the
equitable representation of suitably qualified people from designated
groups in all occupational levels in the workforce”,15 but section 15(3)
provides that such measures “include preferential treatment and
numerical goals, but exclude quotas”. This weakly worded prohibition on
quotas led to a measure of uncertainty as to the legitimacy of the use of
14 See AM Louw “‘I am not a number, I am a free man!’ The Employment Equity
Act, 1998 (and other myths about ‘equality’, ‘equity’ and ‘dignity’ in post-
apartheid South Africa (Part 1)” (2015) 18 PELJ 594-667; and AM Louw “‘I
am not a number, I am a free man!’ The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and
other myths about ‘equality’, ‘equity’ and ‘dignity’ in post-apartheid South
Africa (Part 2)” (2015) 18 PELJ.
15 S 15(2)(d) as amended by the Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of
2013.
386    2019 De Jure Law Journal
quotas. It prompted me, in 2006, to examine the differences between
targets and quotas (and to argue for the illegality of the use of quotas as
opposed to targets).16 Now, more than ten years later, we are probably
not much more enlightened as to the exact meaning of what constitutes
a “quota”, mainly because the majority of the Constitutional Court in
South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard (“Barnard”),17 by way
of Moseneke J, expressly refrained from defining quotas in this
context.18 While heeding Pretorius’s call for a normative rather than
definitional approach to determining the legality of numerical goals in an
affirmative action programme which may function as quotas,19 one does
have to consider what actually constitutes a quota, and how it differs
from a numerical target. I have attempted to do so elsewhere.20
However, I would suggest that we are at the current point in time, at least
somewhat more enlightened regarding the constitutionality of quotas in
the application of affirmative action. 
In Barnard we find Moseneke J expressly condemning quotas, by
observing that “the primary distinction between numerical targets and
quotas lies in the flexibility of the standard. Quotas amount to job
reservation and are properly prohibited by section 15(3) of the [EEA]”.21
A number of the judges in that case referred to the use of quotas and
appeared to reject their constitutionality.22 In subsequent cases,
following on Barnard, we find other courts also engaging with the issue
and apparently holding that quotas are unconstitutional,23 including the
16 In Louw (2006) SA Merc LJ 336-354.
17 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC). 
18 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard para 42.
19 JL Pretorius “The limitations of definitional reasoning regarding ‘quotas’
and ‘absolute barriers’ in affirmative action jurisprudence as illustrated by
Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services” (2017) 28 Stell LR 269.
20 If I may be allowed to quote my own, rather simplistic, distinction between
these two concepts as contained in an earlier article: “Goals [or targets]
represent a preconceived target or objective of what is rationally capable of
achievement in the light of the expected impact of external factors. Quotas,
on the other hand, function as an end in themselves by providing a ‘target’
that is non-negotiable, fixed and removed from the reality of factors that
determine the achievability of a true goal. Accordingly (in the context of
transformation), while ‘goals’ represent objectives, a quota functions as a
measure in itself.” See, Louw (2005) Law, Democracy & Development 207.
21 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard para 54.
22 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard paras 42 and 54 per
Moseneke ACJ (and, by implication, in paras 65 and 66); Cameron J,
Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in para 87 (and by implication, in paras 91, 96,
119, 123); and Van der Westhuizen J (by implication in footnote 132 to the
text of para 127). It is interesting that Jafta J, who apparently expressly
approved of race-based job reservation (in para 227), made no mention of
the issue of quotas, as legitimate or otherwise.
23 See Davis JA in South African Police Service v Public Service Association of
South Africa 2015 36 ILJ 1828 (LAC) para 41; see Thlothlalemaje AJ in
Solidarity v SA Police Services 2015 7 BLLR 708 (LC) para 49 and paras 53-
54; see Katz AJ in South African Restructuring And Insolvency Practitioners
Association v Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development; In Re:
Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Association NPC and Others v Minister of
Justice And Constitutional Development 2015 2 SA 430 (WCC) paras 203-217.
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Constitutional Court itself.24 In fact, the courts have on occasion
displayed a willingness, following Barnard, to be quite direct and to the
point in roundly condemning quotas:
“Racial or gender quotas as applied within the workplace as indicated in
Barnard equate to job reservation, and furthermore attract negative
connotations and for good reasons. Not only are they inherently and
irrationally discriminatory, they are also demeaning in implementation in that
they fail to acknowledge an individual’s worth. In most instances, and
unwittingly so, they promote mediocrity and incompetence, and instil a false
sense of entitlement. Invariably and whether rightly or wrongly, beneficiaries
of the quota system will always be viewed as inferior and incompetent, as the
assumption will always be that they got recognition or appointment simply to
make up the numbers rather than based on their suitability or competencies.
In a society such as ours and in our workplaces, where we are still battling the
demons of racial polarisation and tensions, the use of quotas adds fuel to
those tensions and creates further suspicions and resentment. Any
affirmative action measure based on quotas is inherently ‘arbitrary,
capricious and displays naked preference’, and would accordingly not pass
[the] constitutional test [for lawful affirmative action] as stated in Van
Heerden and Barnard.”25
I am buoyed by signs of an apparent, impending about-turn in the
jurisprudence – even if evident thus far mostly in minority judgments,26
– regarding both the rationality and fairness of the EEA’s “numbers
game” when it comes to its affirmative action scheme. I have argued
previously that rigid demographics-based target-setting inevitably turns
constitutionally legitimate targets into illegitimate quotas.27 Briefly, the
argument goes thus: The EEA requires affirmative action measures to be
taken in order to achieve “equitable representation” or groups in the
workplace. A designated employer must take such measures once it is
found that a group or groups are “under-represented”. Such employer
may then set targets for the achievement of equitable representation.
When demographic statistics are used – especially if they are used as
24 As per Zondo J (writing the majority judgment) in Solidarity v Department of
Correctional Services 2016 5 SA 594 (CC) paras 50-51; and Nugent J (writing
for the minority) paras 109-111; paras 114-115 and para 118.
25 Per Thlothlalemaje AJ in Solidarity v SA Police Services 2015 7 BLLR 708 (LC)
para 54.
26 One never knows what the impact of such minority judgments may be in
future. As Franny Rabkin observes: “Judges must disagree sometimes –
dissenting judgments are crucial. As the late justice Ismail Mahomed
famously said: ‘The orthodoxy of yesterday often becomes the heresy of
tomorrow. The most famous example of the importance of dissenting
judgments is the lone dissent in the US Supreme Court’s Plessy vs Ferguson
ruling on segregation laws, which years later laid the basis for Brown vs
Board of Education, which repudiated the doctrine of separate but equal. As
the late chief justice Pius Langa also said in 2007, dissent makes judicial
deliberation stronger: ‘If people speak up, the group as a whole is more
likely to reach the correct outcome’.” From F Rabkin “Judges’ claws come
out in Pretoria street name case” (02-08-2016) BDLive http://www.bdlive.
co.za/opinion/columnists/2016/08/02/law-matters-judges-claws-come-out-
in-pretoria-street-name-case (accessed 2018-11-18). 
27 See Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 1) 594-667.
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rigidly as they were by the DCS in Solidarity v Department of Correctional
Services (“Solidarity”), with reference to the actual demographic
representation of each racial group in the national population – any level
of representation of a specific group which falls below the demographic
representation of the relevant group would mean that such group is
under-represented, and that such demographic target must be pursued
until such time as the relevant percentage representation for the group
has been reached. This percentage is then, clearly, no longer a “target”,
and the requisite percentage representation of the group has inevitably
come to function as a rigid quota.28 Nugent J (with Cameron J concurring)
expressed clear and forceful reservations about the “fundamental
malaise” inherent in such a numbers game, in Solidarity:29
“The passages from judgments of [the Constitutional Court] … all recognise
that reconciling the redress the Constitution demands with the constitutional
protection afforded the dignity of others is profoundly difficult. That goal is
capable of being achieved only by a visionary and textured employment
equity plan that incorporates mechanisms enabling thoughtful balance to be
brought to a range of interests. It is only in that way that the constitutional
tensions referred to in Barnard are harmonised. And it is in that way that the
Constitution’s demand for a public service that is “broadly representative of
the South African people” will be realised. Ours are a vibrantly diversified
people. It does the cause of transformation no good to render them as ciphers
reflected in an arid ratio having no normative content.”30
One can only hope that what these last two judges refer to as the “cold
and impersonal arithmetic” approach to affirmative action,31 will soon
be a thing of the past.32 There are indications that this may be the case,
as I will discuss below.
Fundamental to the problem with quotas is the fact that they are a very
blunt instrument, which fail dismally to harmonise or even address the
“constitutional tensions referred to in Barnard”. They are insensitive to
context and by definition apathetic towards their impact on beneficiaries
28 See also Pretorius (2017) Stell LR 284-285
29 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 2016 5 SA 594 (CC) para
133.
30 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services Para 133.
31 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services Para 102.
32 De Vos has also expressed reservations about the approach of the majority
in the Solidarity judgment: “The majority judgment, in my view, is a text of
its time and goes further than previous Constitutional Court judgments in
insulating redress measures from constitutional attack. The judgment
would make it difficult to invalidate employment equity measures unless
they allow for the appointment of unqualified candidates or are
implemented in a corrupt or nepotistic manner. In this sense, it may well
be far less of a victory for the litigants than they might at first have





V7HR1E0w_IX (accessed 2018-11-11). 
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and non-beneficiaries alike. In addition, Pretorius succinctly explains
why (what he calls) the “definitional approach”33 of the courts (as
opposed to a normative approach) to assessing the legality of quotas or
the rigid application of numerical goals is lacking in constitutional
legitimacy:
“[T]he ultimate marker to distinguish acceptable numerical targets from
unlawful quotas or barriers is not whether an employment equity plan
contains a deviation clause as such, but whether the flexibility that such a
clause makes provision for can accommodate all the implicit considerations
of an inclusive notion of substantive equality, along with all the
constitutionally protected interests, rights and values inherent in such
disputes. Thus, the narrow deviation clause in [Department of Correctional
Services] arbitrarily diminished the contextual factors that should have
steered the design and implementation of the numerical employment equity
targets in line with an inclusive notion of substantive equality and a holistic
reading of the Constitution (or, in Sachs J’s words … “the fundamental
constitutional values called into play by the situation.”).34 One struggles to
comprehend how a plan that omits considerations that could very well be
intimately related to the substantive equality ideal of realising the equal worth
and dignity of all can be called “flexible” in any constitutionally normative
sense, and claim to promote the purpose of the substantive equality right.”35
I would suggest that such definitional approach also loses sight of the
express wording of the first sentence in section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights,
which calls for recognition of substantive equality embracing the “full
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”. Focusing on deviations
from otherwise rigid numerical goals would seem to limit constitutional
scrutiny to a generally narrow class of (frequently, minority designated
group) potential beneficiaries (where such deviation clauses are, by
definition, the exception rather than the rule). In addition, as Malan
observes, in stressing the importance of the first sentence of section 9(2)
in the context of an inter-textual reading of the equality clause as a whole
and section 9(2), specifically:
“The restitutionary measures authorised in the second sentence of section
9(2), that is, the “… legislative and other measures designed to protect or
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination …” are in fact authorised to promote, in the words of the first
sentence of section 9(2) “… the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms”. Restitutionary measures may therefore quite obviously not create
new inequalities. If so, they unjustifiably go beyond the aim of such measures
and are incompatible with the above quoted first provision of section 9(2).
33 Pretorius refers to the courts’ apparent preference for focusing on deviation
provisions in policies that constitute otherwise rigid numerical goals in
order to distinguish between legitimate numerical goals and illegitimate
quotas – see, generally, Pretorius (2017) Stell LR 269.
34 In Minister of Finance & Another v Van Heerden 2004 25 ILJ 1593 (CC) para
140.
35 Pretorius (2017) Stell LR 281.
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They are provided for in order to enable full and equal enjoyment of all rights
and freedoms, not only for some categories of persons but for all.”36 
More recently, in respect of the constitutionality of quotas, the following
view was expressed by Mathopo JA in the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association (“SARIPA)”:37
“[R]emedial measures must not … encroach, in an unjustifiable manner,
upon the human dignity of those affected by them. In particular, as stressed
by Moseneke J in para 41 of Van Heerden, when dealing with remedial
measures, it is not sufficient that they may work to the benefit of the
previously disadvantaged. They must not be arbitrary, capricious or display
naked preference. If they do they can hardly be said to achieve the
constitutionally authorised end. One form of arbitrariness, caprice or naked
preference is the implementation of a quota system, or one so rigid as to be
substantially indistinguishable from a quota.”38 
Sadly, in the Constitutional Court in SARIPA,39 Madlanga AJ (Kollapen AJ
and Froneman J concurring) once again showed a disinclination on the
part of a Constitutional Court judge to engage directly with the
constitutionality of quotas, by expressly refraining from examining the
issue.40 I have elsewhere observed that Jafta J’s apparent endorsement
of race-based job reservation in Barnard,41 – and this in the face of
Moseneke J’s observation in the majority judgement in that case that
“[q]uotas amount to job reservation and are properly prohibited by
section 15(3) of the [EEA]”42 – is extremely troubling. In addition, it
would seem that Madlanga AJ in SARIPA (CC) shares this world view,
when he states, “I see no irrationality in distributing work in a way that
uses the demographic make-up of South Africa as a point of departure in
order to promote equality”.43 I previously lamented the lack of clarity in
36 K Malan “Constitutional Perspectives on the Judgments of the Labour
Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Solidarity (acting on
behalf of Barnard) v South African Police Services” (2014) De Jure 118-140
139. See also Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 2) 672-673.
37 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association 2017 3 SA 95 (SCA).
38 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association para 32.
39 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association CC [2018] ZACC 20.
40 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association Saying the following
(at para 79): “This Court has in the past pointed towards the possibility of
the use of quotas being constitutionally impermissible under certain
legislation. I do not find it necessary to engage in a debate whether – under
section 9(2) – quotas are similarly outlawed.”
41 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association para 227 in that
judgment.
42 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association para 54.
43 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v South African
Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association para 98.
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the Constitutional Court on (or even just real engagement with) the
purported link between demographic statistics and the pursuit of
substantive equality in terms of our Constitution and the empowering
legislation,44 and this statement by Madlanga AJ is another example of
somewhat fluffy reasoning – with quite far-reaching implications – not
backed up by proper explanation or reasons. Race-based job reservation
based on the “cold and impersonal arithmetic” of rigid recourse to
population statistics may in some way be rational (although not to my
mind),45 but one wonders whether it can be proportional and fair in the
context of the constitutional purpose (and, importantly, the limits) of
remedial and restitutionary measures. Unfortunately, and I would
suggest, shockingly, our highest court may appear not to be the forum we
should expect clear answers from in this regard in the foreseeable future. 
Help may, however, soon be forthcoming from other quarters. The
South African Human Rights Commission (“SAHRC”), in its Equality
Report 2017/18 released on 12 July 2018, remarked that the
Constitutional Court in its judgments regarding the application of
affirmative action in certain government departments (see Barnard and
Solidarity) is “sharply divided” in its determination of whether purported
numerical targets amount to rigid quotas. In addition, this it condemns:
“However, the Constitutional Court has been sharply divided in determining
whether the implementation of purported numerical targets by certain
government departments amounts to rigid quotas. Moreover, the Court has
inadvertently created the risk that members of designated groups – and
especially those individuals who suffer multiple forms of discrimination –
may be prejudiced by the rigid implementation of targets, thereby raising the
spectre of new imbalances arising.”46
The SAHRC condemns Zondo J’s extension (in Solidarity) of the “Barnard
principle”47 to apply also to other designated groups (African, coloured
and Indian persons and to different genders):
“This effectively means that where, for example, African females are
sufficiently represented at a certain employment level, a wealthy,
heterosexual White man could be granted preferential treatment to the
detriment of a poor, African, homosexual woman. The latter application of
the Barnard principle therefore conflicts with the [United Nations Committee
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s] requirement for special
measures to be adopted on the basis of a realistic appraisal of need, taking
into account the social and economic circumstances of the group or
individual concerned. It furthermore stands in opposition to the approach
44 In Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 2) 669-733.
45 See Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 1) 624-633.
46 South African Human Rights Commission Equality Report 2017/18:
Achieving substantive economic equality through rights-based radical socio-
economic transformation in South Africa 35-36.
47 Namely, that where members of a designated group (in Barnard, white
females) are over-represented in the workplace, they may be denied the
benefits of advancement under an affirmative action policy by a designated
employer. 
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reflected in the National Development Plan, whereby preference should be
accorded on the basis of race ‘for at least the next decade’ when defining
historical disadvantage. Where special measures may result in new
imbalances or exacerbate current inequality viewed in the labour context
more broadly, it is doubtful that such measures are ‘designed’ to advance
people in need of remedial measures. Worryingly, it can lead to perverse
consequences and ‘token’ affirmative action where minority status, or new
patterns of discrimination and inequality within designated groups, is not
properly considered.”48
Ultimately, the SAHRC found (in its 2nd finding regarding the compliance
of South Africa with international obligations in respect of affirmative
action or special measures) that the EEA’s current affirmative action
scheme is likely unconstitutional. In addition, it condemned the use of
quotas:
“It is further found that the EEA and its implementation, as well as the design
of special measures, are currently misaligned to the constitutional objective of
achieving substantive equality. It is accordingly recommended that in
qualitatively assessing the impact of affirmative action measures on
vulnerable groups, including indigenous peoples and people with disabilities,
the [Department of Labour], in collaboration with the [Commission for
Employment Equity] and in consultation with National Treasury, undertakes a
representative assessment of the implementation of employment equity
plans of designated employers in order to ensure that targets are flexibly
pursued and do not amount to rigid quotas.”49 
It is significant that the SAHRC has suggested substantial amendments to
the EEA,50 in order to move away from the current identification and
classification of “designated groups” – a move away from the EEA’s
demographics-based “numbers game” and its absolute preference for
race, to a needs-based system that would place socio-economic
circumstances and disadvantage much higher on the totem pole. It is
submitted that such legislative amendments, if effected, would ultimately
sound the death knell for (race-based) quotas. As our courts have
confirmed, quotas are essentially not context-sensitive, and seeing that it
would be impossible to formulate a one size-fits-all classification based
on (what would have to be imaginary) uniform socio-economic
circumstances calculated along racial lines, race-based quotas would be
impossible to both formulate and implement. And this should also, to my
mind, require adaptation if not the wholesale removal of the
demographic representivity yardstick from section 42 of the EEA
(although, as I previously observed, it might deserve retention as one
potential means of benchmarking designated employers’ progress in
48 SAHRC Equality Report 2017/18 36.
49 SAHRC Equality Report 39.
50 The report recommends that the Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development, the Department of Labour the Commission for Employment
Equity “must jointly report to the Commission within six months of the
release of this Report on information considered and steps intended to be
taken to address these recommendations”, including the suggested
amendments to the EEA.
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implementing affirmative action, rather than – as it currently functions –
as the ultimate objective of affirmative action under the Act).51 It could
likely be replaced with a mechanism or mechanisms similar to the
NSFAS student loan system (where students whose parents earn more
than R600 000 per year, do not qualify for assistance).52 Classification of
potential beneficiaries of affirmative action would proceed divorced from
the use of the invidious apartheid-era racial classifications, which has so
blighted the EEA since its inception. In addition, this would be a positive
development, if only to curb the unintended consequences of the EEA’s
current obsession with race and with demographics and representivity.
As Dupper points out:
“[I]n order for affirmative action policies to have more than a “remote
distributive effect”, a tight fit between status and disadvantage is required. If
not, it invites the familiar objection that affirmative action is both over- and
under-inclusive. To put it succinctly: if the aim of affirmative action measures
is to address socio-economic disadvantage, then a group demarcated by
status, such as race or gender, might, for example, be over-inclusive by
including wealthier black or female people, and under-inclusive, by excluding
poor white men.”53
A needs-based system of classification of beneficiaries based on socio-
economic circumstances and lived disadvantage would avoid the current
EEA scheme’s major shortcoming, whereby “affirmative” action under
the Act “[i]nstead of promoting non-racialism … promotes … for the
want of a better phrase – perverse race rivalry- and instead of embracing
non-sexism it proffers tokenism. Instead of promoting harmony, peace
and stability it holds potential for considerable inter group contestation,
conflict and protests amongst the designated groups. This undermines
the pursuit of non-racialism and non-sexism”.54 
It is ironic, however, that if the suggested amendments to the EEA are
effected in order to bring the Act’s affirmative action scheme in line with
the Constitution, the impetus for such process would not have come from
our highest court. Instead, and somewhat reminiscent of the process of
the demise of apartheid, it would come ultimately from international
pressure in terms of South Africa’s commitments under international law
(by means of the SAHRC’s obligations to comply with United Nations
obligations regarding the eradication of racial discrimination). 
51 See Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 1) 627-629.
52 This example is referred to in an article on the SAHRC Equality Report by
T Eloff “The SAHRC Equality Report: Light at the end of the tunnel for
minorities?” (11-09-2018) FW De Klerk http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/
en/latest/news/805-article-the-sahrc-equality-report-light-at-the-end-of-the-
tunnel-for-minorities (accessed 2018-11-20). 
53 O Dupper “Affirmative action in comparative perspective” in O Dupper &
K Sankaran (eds) Affirmative Action: A View from the Global South (2014)
21-22. 
54 In the words of Shaik AJ in Naidoo v Minister of Safety and Security 2013 3
SA 486 (LC) paras 177 and 188 (in condemning an employment equity plan
applied in terms of the EEA). 
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It would seem (and it is hoped) that the above development, albeit
snail-paced, of jurisprudence on the illegality of quotas may augur the
imminent demise of such measures in the application of affirmative
action in employment. But will this translate to its demise in
(professional) sport?
3 Why race-based quotas in sports teams are 
illegal
Mention was made earlier of the frequent demands from government for
the implementation of racial quotas in a number of prominent sporting
codes. Such demands have now translated into actual and aggressive
punitive measures imposed by government on sports federations (such
as the ministerial ban on bidding for and hosting of future international
events, as mentioned in the introduction above). Such demands have
been successful, and they translated into actual implementation of such
policies – in rugby, 2014 saw the introduction of racial quotas in the
Currie Cup and Vodacom Cup competitions, and, in 2016, CSA
announced the first official race-based quota selection policy for the
national team in the democratic era. The following, from a September
2014 media report, illustrates the level of the quota rot in South African
rugby as planned for implementation at that time:
“By 2019, half the players in all these teams – at national, Super Rugby,
Currie Cup and Vodacom Cup levels – must be black. Under the targets set for
next year:
Seven out of the 23 players in all the Super Rugby teams must be black and
five black players must be on the field at all times.
Eight out of the 23 players in Western Province’s Currie Cup team must be
black and a minimum of six black players must be on the field at all times.
Saru has set quota systems for all teams right down to U-18 Craven Week and
the amateur teams. These teams have to abide by the quotas before
September 2015.
Southern union teams have higher quota requirements than unions up north.
In the Western Province, 35 percent of players must be black while the Lions
and Bulls have to have 30 percent black players. Saru president Oregan
Hoskins said yesterday the quotas were higher for southern unions because
there were more black players playing the game in this union. 
Saru also aims to increase the number of rugby players at primary, high
school and community leagues - and to train more referees and coaches. The
plan says that in future 80 percent of all players recruited for Saru academies
must be black.”55
55 C Coetzee “SARU stands by rugby quota plan” (08-09-2015) IOL https://
www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/saru-stands-by-rubgy-quota-plan-1747229
(accessed 2018-11-20). 
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What baffles the mind, in light of the above examination of the
constitutionality of quotas as reflected in the recent jurisprudence
emanating from our courts, is how those in power in government and in
these sporting codes have managed to get away with this, virtually scot-
free (if not in the public discourse, then in the courts). To my knowledge,
just one case has been brought before a court to challenge the legality of
this form of “sports transformation”, to date (a matter that is currently
pending before the Labour Court, which will be discussed briefly in part
4 in the text below). I find the lack of litigation in this context over the
past two decades truly puzzling. As an academic lacking direct locus
standi, however, I can only lament the state of affairs and explain here
why I find it so puzzling and troubling.
3 1 The applicability of the relevant domestic legislation 
and the South African Constitution
The National Sports and Recreation Act 110 of 1998 (as amended),56 (the
“NSRA”) provides for the application of affirmative action in sport.
Section 4(2)(g) and (h) of the Act state specifically that the national policy
on sport as determined by the Minister of Sport may relate inter alia to
“help in cementing the sports unification process; and instituting
necessary affirmative action controls which will ensure that national
teams reflect all parties involved in the process”. Section 13A (inserted in
the Act in 2007) provides that “[t]he Minister must issue guidelines or
policies to promote equity, representivity and redress in sport and
recreation”. Furthermore, the catch-all provision in section 14(k) of the
Act provides the Minister with the power to make regulations “generally,
as to any other matter in respect of which the Minister may deem it
necessary or expedient to make regulations in order to achieve the
objects of this Act”. Section 13(5)(a)(ii) of the Act empowers the Minister
to intervene in any non-compliance with guidelines or policies issued in
terms of section 13A or any measures taken to protect or advance
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
as contemplated in section 9(2) of the Constitution, by referring the
matter for mediation or issuing a directive, as the case may be”. Apart
from these provisions, it is unclear what “instituting necessary
affirmative action controls which will ensure that national teams reflect
all parties involved in the process” entails, exactly. The NSRAA did curb
the Minister’s powers in this regard in respect of the issuing of directives,
quite significantly. Section 13(5)(b)(ii) provides as follows:
“The Minister may not interfere in matters relating to selection of teams,
administration of sport and appointment of, or termination of the service of,
the executive members of the sport and recreation body”.57 
56 By the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act 18 of 2007
(“NSRAA”).
57 This provision, of course, seems to directly prohibit the former Minister of
Sport’s ministerial ban on the hosting of events of April 2016, as referred to
in the introduction above. This is a saga for another day. 
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Generally speaking, the NSRA provides little guidance on the exact
meaning of “affirmative action” in the context of sport (and recreation).
As such, it provides no discrete source of legislative authority for some
special form of affirmative action (as the EEA does, which diverges
significantly from the constitutional license for affirmative action
contained in section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights).58
The NSRA does not appear to be a legislative measure that pertinently
regulates the application of affirmative action in terms of section 9(2) (as
referred to in section 9(4) of the Bill of Rights). Also, unlike section 5(3)
of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
4 of 2000 (“PEPUDA”),59 the NSRA does not qualify its application to
sport in any way vis a vis other legislation – particularly labour legislation.
Accordingly, like all legislation, it must comply with the Constitution and
its parameters for constitutionally legitimate affirmative action.
Moreover, accordingly, what was said above about the use of racial
quotas as affirmative action measures, generally, must hold true in the
context of sport as regulated under the Act. 
When it comes to the application of employment laws in the
professional sports industry, our courts and the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) have on a number of
occasions held, quite clearly, that professional athletes in team sports
such as rugby, cricket and football, are “employees” as defined by our
labour legislation. As employees, such players are covered by such
legislation.60 This includes the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and
notably for present purposes, the EEA. Accordingly, the above-
mentioned prohibition (in section 15(3) of the EEA) on the application of
58 As explained in more detail in Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 1) 594-667.
59 Section 5(3) of PEPUDA provides that: “This Act does not apply to any
person to whom and to the extent to which the Employment Equity Act,
1998 (Act 55 of 1998) applies”.
60 The EEA and Labour Relations Act take precedence over any other
conflicting statute such as the National Sport and Recreation Act that may
purport to regulate the employment relationship. For recognition of the
employment status of players, see generally R le Roux “Under Starters
Orders: Law, Labour Law and Sport” (2002) 23 ILJ 1195; Jordaan in JAA
Basson & MM Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa (2000) ch 8–1; MW
Prinsloo “Enkele Opmerkinge oor Spelerskontrakte in Professionele
Spansport” (2000) TSAR 229 229-230; A van Niekerk “Labour Law in Sport:
a Few Curved Balls” (1997) 6 Contemporary Labour Law 91; S Smailes
“Sports law and Labour Law in the Age of (Rugby) Professionalism:
Collective Power, Collective Strength” (2007) 28 ILJ 57; and in the case law
McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club 2003 2 BLLR 193 (LC); Augustine and
Ajax Football Club 2002 23 ILJ 405 (CCMA) (where the CCMA assumed
jurisdiction over an unfair dismissal dispute between a professional
footballer and his club, although preferring to refer such dispute to private
arbitration as agreed between the parties in the employment contract);
Smith v United Cricket Board 2003 5 BALR 605 (CCMA); SARPA obo Bands /
SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 BALR 209 (CCMA); SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v CCMA
2006 1 BLLR 27 (LC); Botha v The Blue Bulls Co case no JR1965/2005 of 27-
06-2008; and most recently at the time of writing SA Football Players Union
v Free State Stars Football Club (Pty) Ltd 2017 38 ILJ 1111 (LAC).
  Revising the lawfulness of racial quotas (in South African (professional) team sports)   397
quotas in an affirmative action policy or programme implemented under
the EEA applies to sports employers (professional franchises or clubs,
provincial unions and the relevant national federation as employer of
nationally contracted players) as designated employers under the EEA.
Even though the provisions of section 42 of the Act (as amended) still
allow designated sports employers to consider national and regional
demographics in setting targets for the equitable representation of
employees (including professional athletes), the use of quotas is
prohibited.61 
It bears mentioning that even absent the EEA’s prohibition on quotas,
the above-mentioned jurisprudence from the courts has, in any event, to
a significant extent condemned the legitimacy of quotas, and such
condemnation should even apply to affirmative action outside the
corners of the EEA, as being constitutionally non-compliant with the
prescripts of section 9(2) of the Bill or Rights. Accordingly, the use of race-
based quotas in amateur sport would also fall foul of the Constitution.
In a nutshell, therefore, there is nothing contained in the applicable
legislation, which allows for the use of racial quotas in professional sports
teams, and, in fact, the applicable labour legislation (the EEA) expressly
prohibits its use. In contexts where the labour legislation does not apply,
such as amateur sport, the apparent unconstitutionality of (racial) quotas
in terms of the evolving jurisprudence on the issue must also be taken to
be an absolute bar to its application. 
61 Some proponents of the use of race-based quotas in professional sports
teams may argue that the context should be distinguished from the
application of affirmative action in more run-of-the-mill employment
scenarios, where, in the latter case, affirmative action is applied primarily
in recruitment and selection processes while, in the former case,
affirmative action is applied only in the selection of players to compete in
matches (and thus would not necessarily affect the actual employment of
non-selected players). This loses sight of the fact that the EEA provides that
affirmative action in line with the purposes of the Act may provide
justification for an employer for what would otherwise amount to unfair
discrimination (section 6(2)), and that the Act prohibits unfair
discrimination in “any employment policy or practice” (which is very
broadly defined in the Act). Also, it would lose sight of the fact that race-
based quotas may very likely determine hiring decisions; a franchise or
club faced with the necessity to select a fixed number of players of colour in
a team would likely tailor its squad of players to contract for the upcoming
season in order to enable it to select the requisite number of players of
colour (ie fewer white players would be contracted). Also, I have argued
before that professional sport is characterised by its nature as an
entertainment industry, coupled with player sponsorships and
endorsement contracts. Non-selection of white players based on a race-
based quota could significantly impact such contracted players’ future
employment prospects and secondary streams of revenue (ie non-exposure
in matches would mean that even a contracted white player, who still
receives a salary under the playing contract, would potentially miss out on
sponsorship and endorsement deals as a result of non-exposure, not to
mention match bonuses). The implications of the application of affirmative
action in team selections for non-beneficiaries are very similar to its
application in other employment contexts. 
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3 2 While the cat’s away … the practical experience of 
sports quotas 
At its heart, race-based quotas in sport, as a transformation measure,
stumble very early on in the race, at the hurdle of rationality. There is
probably no better context than sporting competition to illustrate the
arbitrary and capricious nature of such application of what purports to be
constitutionally mandated affirmative action but is nothing of the sort. In
addition, post-apartheid South Africa, of course, has the shameful
distinction of being rather unique in the world in terms of the levels of
foolishness reached. I have written previously about Netball South
Africa’s (“NSA”) racial quota system. In 2007 it was reported that NSA
had devised a system to reward teams that comply with the required
racial quotas; instead of docking points from teams that do not meet the
quota (which had been the previous practice), any team that had the
required five-two ratio on court at all times would receive an additional
six goals. NSA regulations required teams to field a ratio of five to two on
court at all times – either five white and two black players, or five black
and two whites. In the past, teams such as Zululand and other rural areas,
who have no white players, were consistently docked points, and in
some cases, failed to win their section even after winning all their
matches. NSA’s president was quoted at the time as explaining, “In the
past, some teams were docked so many points that they went into
negative territory”.62 Really?
Alternatively, let’s consider the more recent tragic-comic events that
transpired in a Highveld Lions franchise cricket match in Johannesburg.
In a match against the Titans in February 2016, the Lions fell foul of
CSA’s race quota, which requires teams to field six players of colour, of
which three must be Black African. African leg-spinner, Eddie Leie, was
injured during the pre-match warm-ups. The Lions had arrived at the
venue with only 12 squad members, and they had no choice but to phone
CSA and to obtain permission to include a white opening batsman (which
CSA agreed to). The problems did not end there, though. When one of
the opening bowlers was injured a couple of overs into the match, the
Lions were forced to include their (Black African) coach, Geoffrey
Toyana, who had retired from professional cricket in 2011. Toyana had
to do some fielding, until the Lions managed to rope in a spectator, a
young white student, who then took to the field in Leie’s kit. Probably the
best thing that happened on that fateful day was that the match rained
out and there was no official result after all these shenanigans. 
In a nutshell, it appears to require very little more explanation why
racial quotas in national (or other) sports teams, both professional and
amateur, are not only clearly unlawful in terms of South African law but
also so irrational that they are making a mockery of our sport in the eyes
62 From a media report entitled “Rewards for racial quotas” (07-08-2007)
http://www.news24.com/News24/Sport/More_Sport/0,,2-9-32_2159954,00.
html (accessed 2018-11-19). 
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of the world. Much has been written in criticism of the very low standard
for the adjudication of the constitutionality of affirmative action as set in
Minster of Finance v Van Heerden (“Van Heerden”),63 and confirmed in
Barnard, namely that of rationality.64 I would suggest that the above (and
other examples) of the innate irrationality and arbitrariness of the
application of racial quotas in sports teams – and the sometimes farcical
implementation of such policies – would disqualify such measures as
being constitutional even in terms of this very low bar. If we apply the
words of Moseneke J in Barnard to racial sports quotas as purported
restitutionary measures under section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights (and, in
that case, within the context of the application of affirmative action in
terms of the EEA), their unconstitutionality is starkly on display:
“The next question beckoning is whether the manner in which a properly
adopted restitution measure was applied may be challenged. The answer
must be, yes. There is no valid reason why courts are precluded from deciding
whether a valid Employment Equity Plan has been put into practice lawfully.
This is plainly so because a validly adopted Employment Equity Plan must be
put to use lawfully. It may not be harnessed beyond its lawful limits or applied
capriciously or for an ulterior or impermissible purpose. As a bare minimum,
the principle of legality would require that the implementation of a legitimate
restitution measure must be rationally related to the terms and objects of the
measure. It must be applied to advance its legitimate purpose and nothing
else. Ordinarily, irrational conduct in implementing a lawful project attracts
unlawfulness. Therefore, implementation of corrective measures must be
rational. Although these are the minimum requirements, it is not necessary to
define the standard finally.”65 
If the legitimate governmental purpose of special measures is to facilitate
the racial transformation of a sporting code, it is highly doubtful that the
cosmetic window-dressing exercise of implementing a racial quota which
changes only the complexion of the relevant team (and does so in terms
of a measure that ignores or significantly devalues sporting merit and the
competition principle in sport) is rationally connected to such purpose.
The measure itself, our courts are starting to say (and the EEA expressly
says), is illegal. If irrational conduct in implementing a lawful measure
attracts unlawfulness, irrational conduct in implementing an unlawful
measure should be even more readily earmarked as being unlawful. 
63 2004 6 SA 121 (CC). For further discussion of the Van Heerden test and its
aftermath, see Albertyn “Adjudicating affirmative action within the
normative framework of substantive equality and the Employment Equity
Act – An opportunity missed? South African Police Service v Solidarity obo
Barnard” 132(4) SALJ (2015) 711.
64 M McGregor “Affirmative action on trial – determining the legitimacy and
fair application of remedial measures” (2013) TSAR 650-675; JL Pretorius
“Accountability, contextualisation and the standard of judicial review of
affirmative action: Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police Services”
(2013) 130 SALJ 31-44; IM Rautenbach “Requirements for affirmative
action and requirements for the limitation of rights” (2015) TSAR 431-443.
65 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC)
paras 38-39.
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While it appears trite to say that these racial quotas are a (rather
atypical and internationally unique) form of application of affirmative
action, it bears consideration whether such quotas as applied to
professional sports teams, in fact, make the grade as “affirmative action
measures” under the EEA (which, as mentioned above, applies to
designated employers and player employees in this context). The
Johannesburg Labour Court recently had occasion to consider whether a
somewhat similar employment policy in fact constitutes an affirmative
action measure. In Solidarity on behalf of Pretorius v City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality,66 the Court confirmed that a legitimate
affirmative action measure must pass the three-pronged test from Van
Heerden, and that the sticking point in many cases will be whether such
a measure passes the third leg of this test, namely whether the measure
promotes the achievement of (substantive) equality. It held:
“The EEA clearly envisages a structured approach to the implementation of
affirmative action measures. The measures must be such that, amongst
others, there are targets, numerical goals and objectives that can be
monitored and measured. The Staffing Policy lacks this. In the absence of
measurable numerical targets and properly formulated measures, it would be
impossible for an applicant who is excluded from promotion or an
appointment to challenge the process and to uphold his or her human
dignity.”67 
 The staffing policy in this case made no provision for numerical goals
and objectives based on an analysis of under-representation of
designated groups. The court held that this policy was not an affirmative
action measure. The acting human resources director of the respondent
had conditionally approved the shortlisting (which was later nullified) of
the applicant, a white male, subject to the condition that only candidates
from designated groups should be shortlisted. This decision to impose a
condition was based solely on workplace profile statistics reflected on the
form submitted to the director for approval:
“His only consideration was the numbers in a table on the form. Those
numbers gave him the impression that there were ‘too many’ white males
reflected in the group. He conceded that there were no numbers or numerical
targets against which he could compare the white male representation.”68 
In the circumstances, the court held that the relevant policy was not an
affirmative action measure under the Act and that the respondent’s
conduct constituted unfair discrimination against the applicant. The race
quotas applied in professional sport are quite similar. There is no
indication that sports employers have set rational numerical goals in
respect of an objective to achieve equitable representation of players
66 Solidarity on behalf of Pretorius v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
2016 37 ILJ 2144 (LC).
67 Solidarity on behalf of Pretorius v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
paras 84-85 of the judgment.
68 Solidarity on behalf of Pretorius v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality
paras 4-13 of the judgment.
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from designated groups.69 In fact, the relevant transformation policies
sometimes expressly call these quotas what they are, inflexible quotas
rather than aspirational targets, and there appears to be no evidence that
these quotas have followed on analyses regarding under-representation
of players from designated groups based on national and regional
demographics in respect of the economically active population (as
section 42 of the EEA requires). Of course, as I have argued before, the
context of sporting competition is probably the supreme example of the
inherent irrationality of the implicit assumption that, had it not been for
past unfair discrimination, our sports teams would have perfectly or even
just closely resembled the national demographics in terms of race. While
the role of merit in the affirmative action debate may have become
significantly undervalued in recent years (in part because of the EEA’s
“suitably qualified” provision in section 20 of the Act), it surely must play
a special role in the context of (professional) sport, where innate sporting
talent, physical characteristics and “big match temperament” are just
some of the intangibles which distinguish a Tiger Woods from the
weekend golfer. I am again reminded of the trenchant criticism by
Thomas Sowell of this mysterious assumption of a natural,
demographically equal spread of skills and talent in the human
population, which underpins the demographic representivity-based
social engineering agenda of the EEA.70 This reminds one of the words
of the counsel for an applicant in another matter: “A target is something
to be aspired to because it is based on some scientific data whereas a
quota system has no science or law. It is arbitrary.”71 In short, such race
quotas are little other than measures that are “arbitrary, capricious or
display naked preference”, as warned about in Van Heerden. 
A related issue regarding the lawfulness of such quotas in the
professional sports context (under the EEA) is the Act’s prohibition on
affirmative action measures constituting “absolute barriers” for the
employment or advancement of persons not from designated groups, as
69 The rationality of affirmative action measures is to an extent to be
determined with reference to whether they are implemented in terms of a
carefully crafted and designed employment equity plan – see Gordon v
Department of Health: Kwazulu-Natal 2008 ZASCA 99; Munsamy v Minister of
Safety and Security and Another 2013 ZALCD 5. 
70 As succinctly explained by Sowell: “The enormous variety of geographic,
cultural, demographic, and other variables makes an even, random, or
equal distribution of skills, values, and performances virtually impossible.
How could mountain peoples be expected to have seafaring skills? How
could an industrial revolution have occurred in the Balkans, where there are
neither the natural resources required for it nor any economically feasible
way of transporting those resources there? How could the indigenous
peoples of the Western Hemisphere have transported the large loads that
were transported overland for great distances in Europe and Asia, when the
Western Hemisphere had no horses, oxen, camels or other comparable
beasts of burden?” (T Sowell “Discrimination, Economics and Culture” in
A Thernstrom & S Thernstrom (eds) Beyond the Color Line: New Perspectives
on Race and Ethnicity in America (2002) 167-180, 171) 
71 From counsel for the applicant’s submissions in Mgolozeli v Gauteng
Department of Finance 2015 3 BLLR 308 (LC) para 24.
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contained in section 15(4) of the Act. I previously wrote about the fact
that this “prohibition” is worded in a rather weak manner,72 but our
courts have concurred in condemning measures, which constitute such
absolute barriers. In the (professional) sports context, it should be noted
that opportunities for athletes to compete at especially the higher levels
are limited, and the pool of potentially suitable athletes is relatively small.
While evidence may be largely anecdotal (compare the well-known
claims by South African-born English Test cricket batsman, Kevin
Pietersen, that he left South Africa for greener pastures abroad as a result
of non-selection under racial quotas), it is at least likely that a race quota
in, for example, the national rugby team might serve to constitute an
absolute barrier to the employment of a white player who would in the
absence of race-based selection likely have made the team on merit. 
Apart from the above-mentioned domestic law implications, racial
sports quotas are also clearly not in line with international standards and
fundamental principles of international sports law, and international law
more broadly. I remarked (in part 2 above) that the impetus for
development of our law in respect of the banning of racial quotas as
legitimate affirmative action measures appears to be coming from South
Africa’s international law obligations. Proponents of racial quotas in sport
should likewise take heed of the fact that the domestic sports
transformation process does not occur within a vacuum, and that in this
context the professional sports industry is a particularly globalised
industry within which domestic stakeholders are to a significant degree
beholden to the rules and regulations of international sports governing
bodies. In that light, let us consider the legitimacy of race quotas in
(professional) sports teams in terms of the relevant principles of
international sports law. 
3 3 Race-based quotas and international (sports) law
In the waning years of apartheid, South Africa was, rightly, banned from
fielding its racially-engineered, all-white teams in international sporting
competitions. The reason for this is that there were rules about this sort
of thing. What may (but should not) surprise the current South African
government is that there still are.
72 S 15(4) does not expressly prohibit absolute barriers, but rather provides
that “nothing in this section requires a designated employer to take any
decision concerning an employment policy or practice that would establish
an absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or
advancement of people who are not from designated groups’. What adds to
the uncertainty regarding whether this constitutes a prohibition on the
creation of absolute barriers, is the fact that section 15(4) starts with the
words ‘Subject to section 42 …”. Does this mean that employers are, in fact,
allowed to create absolute barriers based on demographic representation of
designated groups in the economically active population? If this is the case
this provision would be unconstitutional, and our courts have condemned
the creation of absolute barriers. Case law in recent years appears to have
settled the question in favour of the prohibition of such barriers.
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The 4th Fundamental Principle of Olympism, as contained in the
Olympic Charter,73 provides that “The practice of sport is a human right.
Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without
discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires
mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.”
The 6th Principle provides that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Olympic Charter shall be secured without
discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, sexual orientation,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.” Article 3 of the Constitution,74 of the
International Association of Athletics Federations (“IAAF”) provides that
the objects of the IAAF include “To encourage participation in Athletics
at all levels throughout the world regardless of age, gender or race”, and
“To strive to ensure that no gender, race, religious, political or other kind
of unfair discrimination exists, continues to exist, or is allowed to
develop in Athletics in any form, and that all may participate in Athletics
regardless of their gender, race, religious or political views or any other
irrelevant factor”. 
Bye-Law 3 of World Rugby (the erstwhile International Rugby Board)
describes the objectives and functions of World Rugby, which includes
“To prevent discrimination of any kind against a country, private persons
or groups of people on account of ethnic origin, gender, language,
religion, politics or any other reason”.75 
Article 12 of the International Cricket Council (or “ICC”)’s Articles of
Association (approved by its full council on 22 June 2017) is entitled
“Non-discrimination and stance against racism”, and provides as follows:
“Neither the ICC nor any of its Members shall at any time offend, insult,
humiliate, threaten. disparage, vilify or unlawfully discriminate against
persons based on their race, religion, culture, colour, descent, gender, and/or
national or ethnic origin.”
It is clear that, in principle, the imposition of race quotas in any of the
relevant sporting codes by a domestic member federation would in all
probability fall foul of these provisions. Apart from the uniqueness of
such a “transformation policy” in the international sports context, and
even bearing in mind that under South African law legitimate affirmative
action does not constitute unfair discrimination (as per Moseneke J’s
73 The current version of the Olympic Charter, in force as from 2 August 2015,
is available at https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_
en.pdf (accessed 2018-11-11). 
74 Current version in force as from 1 November 2015 is available at https://
www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf/documents/constitution (accessed 2018-11-11). 
75 Bye-Law 3(f).
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majority judgment in Van Heerden),76 the express prohibition on the use
of quotas contained in the EEA (in the professional sports context) and
the apparently growing backlash amongst members of the judiciary
against the constitutionality of (race) quotas as part of affirmative action
(in the amateur sports context) would likely disqualify such quotas as
legitimate affirmative action and expose them to unfair discrimination
review.
There is another, important, aspect of the international governance of
sport, which bears consideration in this context. It is an accepted
principle of international sports governance that domestic sports
federations, as members of the relevant international governing body
and as representative of the relevant sporting code within the domestic
territory, must act independent from political and governmental
interference in the governance of the sport. The founding documents of
international governing bodies invariably contain provisions to this
effect, frequently providing such international governing bodies the
power to suspend or expel member federations who (or, more
accurately, whose governments) transgress in this regard.
Rule 27 of the Olympic Charter, for example, provides as follows in
respect of the mission and role of National Olympic Committees
(“NOCs”):
“27.5 In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with
governmental bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations.
However, they shall not associate themselves with any activity, which would
be in contradiction with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate
with non-governmental bodies.
27.6 The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any
kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic
pressures which may prevent them from complying with the Olympic
Charter.”
I have written previously about the strange behaviour of the South
African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (“SASCOC”),
when one considers these provisions of the Charter. SASCOC has for
years now been actively involved in pushing the governmental sports
transformation agenda, including the enforcement of race-based quotas,
and I seriously doubt the legitimacy of such activities in light of the above
Charter provisions and fundamental principles of sports governance.77
76 Although, as I have argued before, it appears that Moseneke J’s view might
actually just have exempted legitimate affirmative action from the
presumption of unfairness contained in sec. 9(5) of the Bill of Rights, rather
than providing an automatic and blanket exclusion of affirmative action
measures from determination of whether they might, in fact, constitute
unfair discrimination in any given case – see Louw (2015) PELJ (Part 1) 602.
77 See Louw (2006) International Sports Law Journal 48; AM Louw “Why South
African Sport Should Say No to a State-Sanctioned SASCOC Autocracy – Part
1: The background and nature of SASCOC” (2007) De Jure 257-276;
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Other international governing bodies have similar rules. Bye-Law 14(e)
of World Rugby (formerly the International Rugby Board) provides that: 
“A Union may be expelled from World Rugby membership pursuant to World
Rugby Bye-Laws and/or Regulations if state authorities interfere in its affairs
in such a manner that
(i) It may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation
of rugby related matters in its territory; 
(ii) In the opinion of Council or the Executive Committee it is no longer in a
position to perform its constitutional and regulatory tasks in an
appropriate manner.”
When one considers the content of the above-quoted media statement
by former SARU president Oregan Hoskins (quoted in the introduction
above) regarding governmental pressure to impose race quotas, it is
questionable whether SA Rugby would be “considered as fully
responsible for the organisation of rugby related matters in its territory”
by its international governing body. Article 2.9(B) of the Articles of
Association of the International Cricket Council provides as follows:
“Where a government interferes in the administration of cricket by a
Member, including but not limited to interference in operational matters, the
selection and management of teams, the appointment of coaches or support
personnel or the activities of a Member, the Executive Board shall have the
power to suspend or refuse to recognise that Member …”. 
The implications of this in the current context are obvious. One such
international governing body that has in recent years actively enforced
provisions regarding political interference by domestic governments is
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”). The world
football governing body has suspended a number of member federations
on this basis, in terms of the following provisions of the FIFA Statutes
(April 2016 edition):
“Article 15:
Member associations’ statutes must comply with the principles of good
governance, and shall in particular contain, at a minimum, provisions relating
to the following matters:
a) to be neutral in matters of politics and religion;
b) to prohibit all forms of discrimination;
c) to be independent and avoid any form of political interference;
…”
77 AM Louw “Why South African Sport Should Say No to a State-Sanctioned
SASCOC Autocracy – Part 2: Questioning the legitimacy of SASCOC” (2008)
De Jure 16-35.
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“Article 19.1:
Each member association shall manage its affairs independently and without
undue influence from third parties.”
The repeatedly reported claims of governmental pressure on sports
federations to transform, and governmental support for the use of race
quotas in this process would probably fall foul of such prohibitions on
governmental interference in sport. More specifically, it is submitted that
the Minister’s ban on bidding for and hosting future events of April 2016
(as discussed in the introduction above) is just such a form of illegitimate
political interference in sports governance. The ban was apparently not
imposed in terms of the 2010 Bidding and Hosting Regulations issued in
terms of the NSRA (which contain criteria for the evaluation of bidding
for events which appear to be in line with a legitimate governmental
purpose, namely to protect the fiscus and ensure the public interest is
served by hosting the relevant events). The ban was expressly imposed
as a punitive measure to punish poor performing federations in respect
of race-based transformation (amidst a milieu of governmental pressure
on federations to implement racial quotas in representative teams). Of
course, one could argue that the transformation of South African sport is
a legitimate governmental objective. However, the majority of the
Constitutional Court in Barnard held that a lawful (affirmative action)
measure must also be lawfully implemented.78 In the same judgment the
court held that the use of rigid quotas in the application of affirmative
action is probably unconstitutional.79 Accordingly, it is highly
questionable whether the bidding and hosting ban, with its clear
objective of enforcing (through a punitive measure) a racial quota
contained in the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between
government and sports federations80 constitutes a legitimate
implementation of a lawful governmental objective. The accompanying
threats by government regarding other potential punitive measures are
similarly troubling in this regard, especially the potential to revoke the
78 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard paras 38-39.
79 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard paras 42 and 54.
80 The former Minister, writing in the foreword to the 2014/15 EPG
Transformation Status Report (the “EPG Report”) – the document upon
whose findings the Minister ostensibly based his decision to impose the
ban – explained that the actual source of the ban is to be found in a
Memorandum of Agreement (“MoA”) which the “big five” sports
federations had signed – “out of their own volition” – with government’s
Department of Sport and Recreation in May 2015. The Minister continued
to explain that this MoA provided for punitive measures to be imposed
against the respective federations in the event of non-compliance in respect
of transformation goals and targets, including the following:“In essence, [to]
revoke a federation[‘s right] to host and bid for major and mega
international tournaments in the Republic in writing in pursuance of the
prescripts of the Bidding and Hosting of Major Events Regulations Gazetted
and Published in line with the National Sports and Recreation Act and also
as a result of not recognizing the said federation.’ From the foreword of the
EPG Report at vi. A full extract of the text (from pages v-vi): “The findings
and recommendations were announced at a public event in May 2015
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opportunity for athletes of such federations to obtain national colours for
purposes of national or international competitions. Such a punitive
measure would not only involve interference in the governance and
management of the relevant federation (a voluntary association), but
would also implicate the rights of individual athletes to compete at the
pinnacle of domestic and international competition (while it would
conceivably, in respect of professional athletes, constitute a limitation of
their constitutional freedom of trade, occupation and profession as well
as their freedom of association, which, I would argue, is not justifiable
under law). 
Finally, apart from international sports law, racial quotas in sport are
probably also inconsistent with international law, more generally. The
Solidarity trade union, in August 2016, made submissions in a complaint
regarding the alleged illegal use of affirmative action by the South African
government before the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (“CERD”).81 Media reports of the proceedings are
scarce. Solidarity’s web site, however, includes the following, which (if an
accurate reflection of the proceedings) may provide some indication of
the Committee’s views as formulated during the hearings:
“Baron Marc Bossuyt, President-Emeritus of the Belgian Constitutional Court
and a member of the committee, responded by mentioning a
misunderstanding about special measures (or affirmative action, as it is
termed in America). It is generally accepted that merit has to play a role. It
seems that, in the political arena, it is implemented in another way. The focus
81 where after the five federations, had out of their own volition, signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the Department of Sport and
Recreation South Africa in 2015. The MoA is premised on the
transformation barometer with clear and concrete transformation targets
and goals over the next five years. The MoA further delineates roles and
responsibilities of each party to the agreement and stipulates punitive
measures to be taken in the event of non-compliance. These punitive
measures include among others the following:
(i) Suspending or withdrawal of Government’s funding to the Federation in
terms of section 10(3)(a) of the Act in writing, if applicable; 
(ii) Withdrawal of Government’s recognition of the particular federation as a
National Federation in terms of section 10(3)(b) the Act in writing where after
the Minister may publish such a decision in the Government Gazette;
(iii) In essence, revoke a federation to host and bid for major and mega
international tournaments in the Republic in writing in pursuance of the
prescripts of the Bidding and Hosting of Major Events Regulations Gazetted
and Published in line with the National Sports and Recreation Act and also as
a result of not recognizing the said federation;
(iv) Withdrawal of the federation’s opportunity to be awarded national colours via
SASCOC to players who participate under the auspices of that particular
federation in order to represent the Republic internationally and nationally;
(v) Terminate the existing five year agreement in writing due to non-compliance;
or
(vi) Request the Minister in writing to consider issuing a directive in terms of
section 13(5)(a) of the Act as SRSA deems fit and appropriate, which may
include but not limited to the withdrawal of political support and
endorsements for sponsorships.”
81 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS
195.
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there is on quantitative rather than on qualitative outcomes. In South Africa,
affirmative action is applied too severely by using the national demographics
as formula. It could still be justified at certain government entities but rigid
measures in the economic and private sector, as well as in sport are absurd,
Bossuyt said. “If you want to help people, it should be done on the basis of
need and poverty and not on the basis of skin colour. [CERD] wants to
eradicate racism. The notion of representivity goes against the Convention. It
could lead to a system similar to the former apartheid system. Certain
committee members indicated that the criteria for affirmative action are
inadmissible under the Convention. The way in which it is being
implemented is no less important than the goal. Race as sole criterion is not
permissible. Other members of the committee were of the opinion that new
forms of discrimination may not be allowed as no form of discrimination was
indeed acceptable.”82
At the very least, these reported observations by members of the
Committee do not augur well for future consideration on the
international stage of the legitimacy of the South African government’s
sports transformation agenda, which appears to have for years been so
obsessed with racial representivity and the use of the blunt measure of
race quotas. Surely “affirmative” measures have a place in the
development of sporting talent, short of express and blatant race-based
selection. It is expected that pressure may in future be put on
international sports governing bodies to address the South African
government’s agenda regarding the application of such quotas in sport
(even if only indirectly, by means of the potential imposition of sanctions
against domestic member federations – and, consequently, their athletes
– who implement such measures).
4 Sports quotas before the courts: current 
litigation
I have previously lamented the fact that, to date, the burning issue of race
quotas in sport has not engaged the attention of the judiciary, and I
expressed surprise at the lack of litigation on the subject. At the time of
writing, however, such a case is currently pending before the
Johannesburg Labour Court. While the eventual outcome is, of course,
uncertain at this time, it deserves brief attention here.
The Solidarity trade union (a frequent litigator in challenges to the
application of affirmative action before the courts) cited SA Rugby, CSA,
Athletics South Africa (“ASA”), NSA, the Minister of Sport and SASCOC as
respondents.83 Solidarity is challenging the constitutionality and
lawfulness of “the mechanical application of demographic profiling and
transformation targets derived from the provisions of the Sport
82 From a report of Solidariteit: Anonymous “Member of UN committee
equates SA government’s racial quotas with apartheid” (10-08-2016)
Solidariteit https://solidariteit.co.za/en/member-of-un-committee-equates-
sa-governments-racial-quotas-with-apartheid/ (accessed 2018-11-24). 
83 Johannesburg Labour Court case number J963/17.
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Transformation Charter … read into the [Memorandum of Agreement]
entered into between [each of] the first to fourth respondents with the
Sports Minister (fifth respondent) and the sixth respondent [SASCOC]”.84
The applicant is seeking an order that the offending provisions of the
Charter and the agreements be declared invalid and of no force and
effect, and be set aside; and that the respondents be interdicted and
restrained from implementing the offending provisions of the Charter
and the agreements insofar as they –
• apply quotas in determining team selection at a national or provincial
level; and
• apply quotas in determining the appointment or declining to make
appointments within the administration, management and specialised
support structures of the first to fourth respondents based purely on such
criteria of such quotas. 
Solidarity claims that the transformation targets which the relevant
federations adopted in their agreements with the Minister and SASCOC
function as rigid quotas, and also constitute absolute barriers to the
employment and advancement of “persons who are not categorised as
generic black or black African”. Solidarity identifies ASA as a “top
culprit”, citing its transformation targets which mandate “100% black
African as well as 100% generic black representation at the … levels [of]
full time employed staff employees, board members, [and] finance
committee members”.85 
The respondents in this matter filed consolidated heads of argument
taking issue with a number of aspects of the applicant’s case. Firstly, the
respondents dispute that the applicant has locus standi in this matter
(mainly because the union’s application was not brought on behalf of a
member). Secondly, the respondents claim that the Labour Court does
not have jurisdiction, as the matter was not first referred to conciliation
before the CCMA, and because the applicants were late in referring the
matter for conciliation and has not asked for condonation for such
lateness. On the merits, the respondents take issue with the applicant’s
allegations that the relevant transformation targets as contained in the
Transformation Charter and the memoranda of agreement signed
between the first four respondents, on the one hand, and the Minister
and SASCOC, on the other, constitute rigid quotas:
“The Transformation Charter and the impugned agreements do not impose
inflexible, rigid racial quotas for employment in sport. Instead, the
transformation policy adopted by the Respondents is multi-faceted, flexible,
context-sensitive, and aims to promote the achievement of equality in the
long-term. The Charter and the agreements make it clear that punitive
measures do not follow if the number targets are not reached without more.
Transformation goals are determined holistically and not based on numerical
84 From the Applicant’s Heads of Argument, dated 31 May 2018, 4 (copy on
file with the author). Regarding the memorandum of agreement referred to,
see the text to n 80 above.
85 Applicant’s Heads of Argument, 55.
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targets alone: the transformation policies adopted by the Respondents are
constitutional redress measures.”86 
A central pillar of the respondents’ argument addresses the applicant’s
claim that the Minister’s punitive ban on the relevant federations
regarding bidding for and hosting events (as discussed in the introduction
above) constitutes a sanction for non-compliance with the relevant
targets, which indicates that such “targets” in fact function as quotas. The
respondents deny that the power to sanction non-performance turns a
target into a quota, relying on the Constitutional Court judgment in
Solidarity, where Zondo J held as follows in this regard:
“Section 24(1)(a) [of the EEA] places an obligation on a designated employer
to assign one or more senior managers to take responsibility for monitoring
and implementing an employment equity plan. Section 24(1)(b) obliges a
designated employer to provide the managers with “the authority and means
to perform their functions”. Obviously, those functions are the functions
concerning monitoring and implementing the employer’s employment equity
plan. Then section 24(1)(c) obliges a designated employer to “take reasonable
steps to ensure that the managers perform their functions”. Managers are
employees. An employer is entitled to indicate to an employee that, if he or
she fails to perform his or her duties or functions properly, disciplinary steps
may be taken against him or her. There is no reason why a provision in an
employment equity plan to the effect that managers who fail to perform their
duties properly in regard to the monitoring and implementation of the
employer’s employment equity plan will be disciplined should be held against
the employer or should be said to render numerical targets quotas.”87 
Of course, this seems to lose sight of the fact that the Minister’s punitive
ban in the current context has nothing to do with section 24 of the EEA,
or an employer’s authority over its employees in giving effect to an
employment equity plan, and it appears that Zondo J’s views in that
regard are thus irrelevant. In essence, we have here a sanction imposed
upon employers by an outside agency – in respect of transformation
“targets” imposed by such employers under pressure from such outside
agency – where the sanction was not imposed based on the fact that the
EEA allows that “managers who fail to perform their duties properly in
regard to the monitoring and implementation of the employer’s
employment equity plan will be disciplined”. If we recall the wording of
the Minister’s media statement quoted in the introduction above, the
Minister resolved to revoke hosting and bidding privileges of the relevant
federations “as a consequence of the aforementioned federations not
meeting their own set transformation targets”. To my mind, this equates
to the clear and unequivocal imposition of a sanction based on the failure
86 From the Respondents’ Consolidated Heads of Argument, 2 (copy on file
with the author).
87 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 2016 5 SA 594 (CC) paras
62-63.
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to meet a target. That surely means that such alleged “target” is actually
a rigidly enforced quota.88
In a nutshell, the respondents’ argument is that the relevant
transformation “targets” that were challenged form just one part of a
multi-faceted, holistic policy to transform sport, and as such cannot be
deemed to be rigid quotas that must be achieved at all costs. Along the
way, the respondents address the applicant’s above-mentioned
challenge regarding, specifically, ASA and the NSAs’ “100% target” in
certain posts:
“The Applicant argues that because ASA’s and NSA’s forecasted
transformation undertakings for certain positions is 100% black
representation, ASA and NSA have undertaken to hire only black people for
those positions. This, the Applicant submits, constitutes a quota and an
absolute bar to employment. The Applicant’s reading of these forecasts
ignores the context within which the undertaking was made. These
undertakings and forecasts, as explained above, are a single factor within a
multi-faceted measure that holistically transforms sport. ASA and NSA have
not undertaken to reach 100% black representation in those positions at all
costs. They have simply indicated that on their prediction, certain positions
will have 100% black representation by a certain date. The undertaking and
the respective contracts between NSA and ASA, on the one hand, and the
SRSA, on the other hand, does not require them to fulfil those forecasts rigidly
and absolutely. A proper implementation of the Transformation Charter and
the EPG Reports does not entail such rigidity.”89
I am rather baffled by this. Even if not a target, or even a quota, how does
one arrive at a “forecast” that predicts that in future certain positions will
eventually be filled by “100% black representation”, unless one is in the
process of actively engineering that outcome (through the imposition of
quotas, or some otherwise nefarious90 scheme)? Even if such
“undertakings” by federations (if not actual “targets”, nor “quotas”) are
just one little cog in a great transformational machine of multi-faceted
and holistic measures and policies to transform sport, they surely smack
of racial quotas which those making these “predictions” must be well
aware of and actively supporting to implement. 
I will not comment further on this matter, which is currently before the
court, nor on the prospects of the respective parties (based solely on their
respective heads of argument). My above discussion might create an
impression on the part of the reader of a lack of objectivity on my part.
If this is accurate, I can only apologise and say that my views are
88 Consider the words of Thlothlalemaje AJ in Solidarity v SA Police Services
2015 7 BLLR 708 (LC) para 53: “‘Quotas’ … are externally imposed, (e.g by
way of legislation, policy, regulations or even practice) and the failure to
meet them is usually met with a sanction.”
89 Respondents’ Consolidated Heads of Argument, 33-34.
90 I would suggest that, even in the (what I view to be dubious) world of
demographics as a proxy for equality, predicting and pursuing 100%
representation of any one race group would be unlawful and anathema to
the constitutional value of equality.
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motivated by sincere excitement at the fact that, at long last and after
more than 20 years of similar “sports transformation measures”, a court
of law is finally being called upon to assess the legality of what has been
going on, blatantly, for so long, and with very little oversight from the
legal community to date.
5 Conclusion
Fourteen years ago, I wrote an article on sports transformation, which I
started with the following quotation:
“The moral position is absolutely clear. Human beings should not be willing
partners in perpetuating a system of racial discrimination. Sportsmen have a
special duty in this regard in that they should be first to insist that merit. And
merit alone, be the criterion for selecting athletes for representative sport.”91
When that article was published, we were nearly a decade into our then
still new (and exciting) democracy. We were also nearly a decade into the
experience of sports transformation measures aimed at turning “lily-
white sports teams” into teams more acceptable to the whole of our
nation and its diverse conglomeration of people from different ethnic,
racial, cultural and social origins. 
It is 2019 now. Our country has gone from the excitement of new
beginnings and apparently limitless prospects for a brighter future,
through the disappointments and frustrations at often corrupt and
ineffective political leadership and “state capture”, to a more recent “new
dawn” of cautious optimism that SAS South Africa would leave the
doldrums and turn its bow towards warmer climes of economic growth,
a future of steadily declining poverty and inequality, and prosperity,
peace and security for all. During all this time, there appears to have been
one constant cause of concern (and frustration for many): frequent and
pervasive instances of poor service delivery by government (at all levels,
and in all provinces) to its people. 
Which brings me to the role of government and of sports federations
in ensuring the transformation of sport. Many commentators have
lamented the “top down” approach of the imposition of race quotas at
the highest levels of competition in certain sporting codes in order to
“transform” those codes. This is an artificial exercise, which, apart from
its dubious legality and constitutionality, holds little potential for real
transformation in the form of the increased development of future talent
from disadvantaged communities. It is simply a matter of logic that real
transformation can only work (and be sustainable) if talent from
disadvantaged groups is nurtured and developed, from a young age. In
addition, government (and sports federations) have frequently come
91 Abdul S Minty, African National Congress (from a paper prepared for the
United Nations Unit on Apartheid. 1971), as quoted in Louw (2005) Law,
Democracy & Development 193-218. 
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under fire for the failure to promote the achievement of this. The political
correctness of organisations such as the Solidarity trade union (and the
civil rights organisation Afriforum) is frequently questioned, but these
organisations have for years actively engaged in the public debate on
sports transformation and have commissioned studies and published
reports in this regard, which are publicly available. Compare the
following from an undated report (which appears to date from 2017)
entitled Transformation in SA Sport: 
“According to the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) only
57,8% of public schools in the country have sporting facilities. The quality of
the existing facilities is often substandard and facilities are very unevenly
distributed. For instance, whilst 77,5% of public schools in Gauteng and
75,1% of schools in the Western Cape have sporting facilities, only 40,6% of
public schools in the Eastern Cape possess such facilities. If the figures are
broken down further, an even more dismal situation emerges. 3 245 out of 5
461 public schools in the Eastern Cape had no sporting facilities in 2015. For
the rest, only 1 412 schools had soccer facilities, 164 had cricket facilities, and
only 333 had rugby facilities. In KwaZulu-Natal, 3 207 out of 5 861 schools
had no sporting facilities. Only 1 591 had soccer facilities and 258 had
cricketing facilities; and a mere 111 could boast rugby fields ... While the top
sporting schools in the country operate on little or no government assistance
and are largely funded and supported by the parents, the dysfunctional
schools are held ransom by very limited government budgets, militant unions
such as the South African Teachers Union (SATU), and absent and/or
unmotivated teachers. Classrooms are overcrowded and the schools try to
serve communities plagued by huge socio-economic problems and their
attendant social ills, such as drugs, single-parent (or child-led) households and
teenage pregnancies.”92
If these statistics are accurate they paint a dismal and very disturbing
picture for anyone who supports the calls for real transformation of sport
in this country (which is a constitutional imperative that may rank rather
low on the list of priorities in our attempts to normalise this very broken
society, but which remains important).
What illegal and unconstitutional quotas, as tokenistic attempts to
create a socially-engineered semblance of normality or of progress in
transformation, do is to provide politicians with talking points to stir up
emotions and rally political support. In addition, it may serve to hide yet
another example of a clear lack of service delivery. It is understandable
that government suffers under often-severe capacity constraints, and
that sport may (as mentioned above) be relatively low on the list of
priorities that face the country. However, race quotas can be nothing but
an ostensible quick fix; in fact, they do not fix a thing in the long run or
in any real way. They are divisive measures, which offend against our
key constitutional objective of the achievement of non-racialism, and
92 From E Brink & J Nortje “Transformation in SA Sport” (2017) Solidariteit 9
https://solidariteit.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Transformation-in-
sport-SA-eng.pdf (accessed 2018-11-24). 
414    2019 De Jure Law Journal
they may very well, in fact, be essentially racist in nature.93 Affirmative
action – which complies with our Constitution – does not constitute
“reverse discrimination”. However, race quotas in sports teams are not
a form of affirmative action, which complies with our Constitution. It is a
pernicious form of unfair discrimination based on race. Two wrongs do
not make a right. It is scandalous that nearly fifty years after Mr Minty
uttered the above-quoted words before the United Nations, we are back
to a system of racially discriminatory selection of sports teams. This
offends not only our own Constitution, but also both the spirit and the
letter of the laws of international sport. 
93 I have previously questioned whether there might be something inherently
racist in the view that a sports team can only be “representative” of our
people if composed along demographic lines.
